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ABSTRACT
Given the nature of mobile devices and unlock procedures, unlock
authentication is a prime target for credential leaking via shoul-
der surng, a form of an observation aack. While the research
community has investigated solutions to minimize or prevent the
threat of shoulder surng, our understanding of how the aack
performs on current systems is less well studied. In this paper, we
describe a large online experiment (n = 1173) that works towards
establishing a baseline of shoulder surng vulnerability for current
unlock authentication systems. Using controlled video recordings
of a victim entering in a set of 4- and 6-length PINs and Android
unlock paerns on dierent phones from dierent angles, we asked
participants to act as aackers, trying to determine the authentica-
tion input based on the observation. We nd that 6-digit PINs are
the most elusive aacking surface where a single observation leads
to just 10.8% successful aacks (26.5% with multiple observations).
As a comparison, 6-length Android paerns, with one observation,
were found to have an aack rate of 64.2% (79.9% with multiple
observations). Removing feedback lines for paerns improves secu-
rity to 35.3% (52.1% with multiple observations). is evidence, as
well as other results related to hand position, phone size, and ob-
servation angle, suggests the best and worst case scenarios related
to shoulder surng vulnerability which can both help inform users
to improve their security choices, as well as establish baselines for
researchers.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Personal and sensitive data is oen stored on or accessed via mobile
devices, making these technologies an aractive target for aack-
ers [17]. In the physical domain, the rst line of defense against
a proximate aacker seeking to gain access to the device is the
unlock authenticator, the method used to authenticate the device
owner to the device, e.g., by entering a 4-digit PIN.
One type of aack faced when authenticating via a mobile device
is shoulder surng, a form of an observation aack by which an
aacker aempts to observe the authenticator of a victim while the
authenticator is being entered on the device [43]. One of the most
cited dangers for smartphone unlocking mechanisms are shoulder
surng aacks [28].
While many users utilize biometric authentication as a supple-
ment to the dominant PIN and graphical (stroke-based) paern pass-
word entry mechanisms, this does not provide universal protection
from shoulder surng. Biometrics are a promising advancement in
mobile authentication, but they can be considered a reauthenticator
or a secondary-authentication device as a user is still required to
have a PIN or paern that they enter rather frequently due to envi-
ronmental impacts (e.g., wet hands). ere are also known to be
high false negatives rates associated with biometrics [7]. Further,
users with biometrics oen choose weaker PINs as compared to
those without [10], suggesting that the classical unlock authentica-
tion remain an important aack vector going forward.
ere is much related work that both proposes and studies shoul-
der surng resistant authentication mechanisms [11–14, 17, 19, 20,
25, 28], but research related to understanding the susceptibility to
shoulder surng of currently used unlock authentication, namely PINs
and Android graphical paern unlock, is limited in nature. Further,
as researchers propose methods and authentication schemes that
oer protections from shoulder surng aacks, we do not have
clear baselines of comparison for improvement (or lack thereof) to
current schemes.
In this paper, we report the results of a comprehensive study of
shoulder surng based on video recordings of a victim authenti-
cating. Our participants, upon viewing the videos, were asked to
recreate the authentication sequences, simulating basic shoulder
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surng aacks. While prior work has considered visual observa-
tions of Android graphical passwords, such as smudge aacks [6]
and animated tracing [39], prior research only considered a single
dimension. We aempt to account for multiple conditions.
• Authentication Type: we compared 4- and 6-digit PINs, and
4- and 6-length Android graphical paerns, with visible
line feedback and without.
• Observation Angle: we considered 5 dierent observation
angles based on videos recorded simultaneously during
authentication.
• Repeated Viewing: we consider situations where the par-
ticipant has a single view of authentication or multiple
views.
• Phone Size: we consider two dierent touchscreen sizes
that are common in today’s market.
• Hand Position: we considered two dierent hand positions
to interact with the device, single handed thumb input, and
two handed index-nger input.
We constructed a comprehensive web-based survey and recruited
participants locally from our institution (n = 91) and online via
Amazon Mechanical Turk (n = 1173) for a mixed-factorial sub-
ject study. Participants, acting as aackers, were presented with
a set of randomized conditions and asked to view a video of an
authentication. ey then aempted to recreate the authentication.
Analyzing the results, we nd that in all seings, Android’s
graphical paern unlock is the most vulnerable, especially when
feedback lines are visible; a single observation successfully aacked
the paern 64.2% of the time with 79.9% for multiple observations
of a 6-length paern. Shorter paerns were even more vulnerable.
Removing feedback lines during the paern entry improved the
security, nding 35.3% successful aacks with a single view and
52.1% success with multiple views for 6-length paerns (conrming
prior work [39]). PINs, however, proved much more elusive to
aack than anticipated. A single observation was sucient to
aack just 10.8% of the 6-digit PINs, degrading to 26.5% aer two
observations.
ese results support what we as a community have believed
to be true anecdotally, and further demonstrates that current au-
thentication methods provide stronger security against shoulder
surng than one might expect. Further, these results suggest that
baselines of shoulder surng success can be applied to this space,
to beer support mobile authentication users. Future work should
allow for improvements over the current worst seings and best
seings for shoulder surng.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
Mobile Authentication Unlock Choices. In order to secure ac-
cess to a mobile device, users are able to use three main mechanisms
to unlock the screen.
• PIN based authentication, sometimes referred to as a pass-
code on iPhones: where a user is asked to recall a PIN
of a least four digits. Newer iPhones, however, require a
6-digit passcode [18]. (A sample PIN layout, as used in our
experiments, is shown in Figure 1.)
• Paern based authentication: where a user is asked to
recall a gesture that interconnects a set of 3x3 contact
Figure 1: Pattern contact points (le), with label indexing be-
ginning at 0, ending at 8, and a PIN layout (right) with digits
0-9, an OK button, backspace button and display screen
points. On the Android OS, four or more points should
be selected. e user must maintain contact through the
authentication, may not reuse contact points, nor jump
over points previously un-contacted in connecting two
points. Figure 1 shows the grid layout for paerns, as well
as our labeling scheme of starting with index 0 through 8.
For example, the L-shaped paern would be 03678.
Additionally, paern based authentication occurs in
two avors. e traditional seing is that visual feedback
line is displayed as the user traverses the contact points (so
called, with-lines). e second version requires the user
to do the same input, but the feedback or tracing lines are
not displayed (so called, without-lines). In prior work, it
has been suggested that the without-lines version of the
Android paern is more secure from observation aacks,
like shoulder surng [39].
• Password based authentication, sometimes called an alpha-
numeric passcode: where a user is asked to recall a standard
text-based password (entered using a so-keyboard) to
unlock the device.
e usability and security of PINs [9, 40], paerns [4, 36] and
passwords [22, 29] have been well documented by researchers.
Beyond these methods, picture-based [46] and biometric based
mechanisms are also used to unlock mobile devices. e laer is
becoming more commonplace. Fingerprint readers (e.g. TouchID
on iPhone v5 or later) and face identication (through apps such
as FaceCrypt or FastAccessAnywhere) can be used to verify the
identity of the user. Biometrics are oen utilized as a secondary
authentication method, and a user with biometric authentication
enabled must also have a PIN set. While biometrics oer promise
to promoting quick authentication, threats related to spoong and
the vulnerabilities associated residual information le on sensors
by victims can pose challenges to users [35]. In this study, we focus
on two most widely used authentication mechanisms [17, 21], PINs
and graphical Android paerns, with- and without feedback lines.
Shoulder surng vulnerability. Numerous types of aacks exist
where mobile authentication sequences can be obtained and used
by third parties (e.g., simple guessing, smudge aacks, malware
aacks [17]). Mobile device users are particularly susceptible to
observational aacks, as these devices are used in a range of public
and unfamiliar environments where threats may be present. Inputs
can be observed and recreated. Furthermore, accessibility features
such as magnication of the typed character or displaying the
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last typed character as cleartext in the password entry eld may
compromise security [32].
Aacks may be performed through direct observation (poten-
tially enhanced through binoculars or low-power telescopes), or
through the use of recording devices (e.g. video cameras for later
playback) which can be used to covertly obtain or infer creden-
tials [23, 43]. Even if the user aempts to shield the screen from
onlookers, security may be compromised through eavesdropping;
listening to secure information which can later be used for purposes
of recreating entry to a mobile device. Research reveals that human
adversaries, even without recording devices, can be more eec-
tive at eavesdropping than expected, in particular by employing
cognitive strategies and by training themselves [26].
Mechanisms to minimize occurrences of shoulder surng.
Solutions to reduce shoulder surng include methods of obscuring
entry (e.g., through the use of screen lters, such as Amzer Privacy
Shield, described by [45]), limiting the ability of third parties to
view authentication stimuli input from a specic angle. Drawmetric
solutions also exist where input is made on the back and/or on the
front of the mobile touchscreen device, obscuring the onlooker’s
view (e.g. the XSide system [13]). Other drawmetric approaches
utilize behavioral biometrics, which can provide an additional au-
thentication factor, to verify the user [37].
Decoy or randomization scenarios have also been proposed [38,
45], where, even aer an observation, it challenges observers in
recreating the authentication because he/she cannot dierentiate
between true and random input. Touch sensitivity can also be
eective. A prescribed level of pressure during input is dicult
for an aacker to recreate [27]. Similarly, unobservable, tactile
feedback can also be used to thwart a shoulder surfer [1, 15, 24],
where the device informs the user which of a set of passwords (or
nonces) to expect.
Kim et al. [23] suggest that current approaches to reducing
shoulder-surng typically also reduce the usability of the system;
oen requiring users to use security tokens, interact with systems
that do not provide direct feedback or require additional steps
to prevent an observer from easily disambiguating the input to
determine the password [30, 43]. Bianchi and Oakley [8] suggest
that authentication becomes a dicult, challenging task as some
systems targeting security against malicious aackers typically
place high demands on users. Wiese and Roth [44] highlight the
diculties in ascertaining the ecacy of shoulder-surng-resistant
technologies due to the lack of comparative studies. e researchers
have highlighted that as set-ups and assumptions made vary by
author, it can be dicult to determine the security and usability of
solutions.
Additionally, most of these studies do not compare directly to the
current state of the art in mobile authentication, namely, how well
do PINs or paerns (or other current methods) perform under aack.
We aempt to ll in that gap here by providing some baselines for
what level of security to expect from current authentication choices.
Evaluations of shoulder surng using video recordings. Ac-
cording to [44], in order to determine the resistance of an interface
to shoulder-surng, the three main methods used by researchers
include: (a) participants are cast into the roles of adversaries and
users, where adversaries observe authentication sessions of users;
(b) an expert adversary observes the authentication sessions of all
participants; or, (c) participants are cast into the role of adversaries
and observe authentication sessions of an expert user. While each
method has its own advantages and disadvantages, considerations
should be made regarding learning, motivation and aptitude, to
develop a more reliable perception of risk.
Most related to this work is when researchers present partici-
pants with sets of video recordings depicting actors aempting to
authenticate entry. Recordings generally aim to simulate an over
the shoulder view. Seing up the videos in this manner ensured that
the aackers would not be aected by inconsistency caused by the
target [13, 34]. In prior work, the choice of number of observations
appears to be arbitrary in nature [44]. Schaub et al. [33] aimed
to determine how participants fare when aempting to recreate
authentication sequences, comparing those watching video footage
vs live aempts (i.e., physically viewing over a user’s shoulder).
Findings revealed that the success rate of video observations are
lower for almost all schemes than the respective live results, with
a few exceptions deviating by only 1–2 observations. Wiese and
Roth [44] recommend preferring live observations to study human
shoulder surng unless good reasons speak in favor of using video.
As our study aempted to perform a large-scale, controlled study
to systematically compare the two authentication methods, we
opted to use video recordings of a single “expert user” being at-
tacked by our participants. is allowed us to perform nely tuned
randomizations and make comparisons between conditions. As
such, as suggested by prior work [33, 44], one can consider these
results as lower-bounds on the security. Live observations from
the same angle would likely increase the vulnerability to shoulder
surng.
Baselines and guidance. While researchers have extensively ex-
plored ways to address shoulder-surng aacks, recommendations
have been proposed on ways to design and conduct these types of
study. For example, Wiese and Roth [44] recommend rather than
arbitrarily selecting a number of observations, that the number of
observations made by adversaries should match their assumptions
about the scenario and the environment where the scheme will be
deployed. Observation strategies should also be taken into account,
to gain a more detailed view of feasible strategies. In terms of
set-up, Sahami Shirazi et al. [31] propose recording video footage
from four dierent angles: front, rear, le and right, in order to
compensate the loss of 3D information in 2D videos. While limited
detail was provided about the relative positioning of each camera,
this type of technique would be useful to beer simulate shoulder
surng scenarios. Schaub et al. [33] have highlighted dierent
ways that users hold and interact with the device. Occlusion by the
user’s hand and ngers may reduce visibility for shoulder surfers
and enhance observation resistance.
As we will describe in the next section, we aempt to account
for many of these factors and suggestions. Namely, we apply video
recordings from multiple angles, allow for repeated observations
and repeated entries, and we also consider dierent form factors
and hand positions for our mobile devices.
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3 METHODOLOGY
We designed a mixed-factorial design with both between- and
within-subject factors in order to reduce the duration of the study to
an acceptable length. Between subjects, we randomized participants
into 12 groups based on the authentication type (3-treatments),
hand position (2-treatments), and phone type (2-treatments). Within
each group, participants were shown a series of videos for a set of
10 authentications. Aer each video, each participant aempted
to recreate the authentication observed. As part of a within group
analysis, the observation angles, the number of observations, and
the number of aempts to recreate the authentication were ran-
domized.
Based on this design, we intended to address the following set
of hypotheses:
• H1: e type of unlock authentication, PIN, Paern with-
lines, Paerns without-lines, aects the shoulder surng
vulnerability.
• H2: Repeated viewings of user input increase the likeli-
hood of a shoulder surng vulnerability.
• H3: Multiple aempts to recreate the input increase the
likelihood of a shoulder surng vulnerability.
• H4: e angle of observations aects shoulder surng
vulnerability.
• H5: e properties of the unlock authentication, such as
length and visual features, aect shoulder surng vulnera-
bility.
• H6: e phone size aects shoulder surng vulnerability.
• H7: e hand position used to hold and interact with a
device aects shoulder surng vulnerability.
In the remainder of this section, we outline the seings of our exper-
iment and the design choices made. We rst discuss the seings of
our video recordings that dictate the participant groups, following
which we discuss the password/PINs used in the experiments, how
they were selected, and the properties they exhibit. Finally, we
discuss the survey mechanisms, training, and other procedures.
3.1 Video Recording Settings
Phone settings. We used two phones in our experiments: Nexus
5 and the OnePlus One. e Nexus 5 is a mid-range size phone,
with a 5” display. e OnePlusOne has a larger form factor of 6”
(compared to 5.4” of the Nexus 5) with a screen size of 5.5”. Both
phones have the same resolution of 1080x1200 pixels. ese two
phones are similar to a wide variety of displays and form factors
available on the market today, for both Android and iPhone. In
charts and tables, we refer to the phones by their coloring, red for
the Nexus 5x and black for the OnePlus One.
e goal of using these two phones is to understand how larger
form factors, which provide more viewable space, may aect the
aackers ability to shoulder surf (H6). ere are also side eects
for a larger display that we did not anticipate. For example, in
Figure 2, with the larger OnePlus One phone, we experienced more
glare on the screen as it was a bit more unwieldy. Being larger
in the hand, the OnePlus phone moved more during PIN/Paern
entry, particularly one-handed, which caused more opportunities
for glare.
Nexus 5 (red phone)
5.43”x2.72” form factor, 4.95” display, 1080x1920
umb Index
OnePlus One (black phone)
6.02”x2.99” form factor, 5.5” display, 1080x1920
umb Index
Figure 2: Phone Types and Hand Positions: top is the Nexus
5x phone and boom is the OnePlus One phone. e Nexus
5x is roughly the size of a iPhone 6s and the OnePlus one is
roughly the size of a iPhone 6s+. On the le is single handed
entry, using the thumb only, and on the right is two handed
entry using the index nger.
Hand positions. We investigated two dierent phone-grips (or
hand positions) for authentication entry. Figure 2 shows the grips.
e images on the top-le and boom-le show a single handed grip
being used, where the thumb is used to enter the authentication.
e images at the top-right and boom-right, the grip is a two
handed grip, where the user holds the phone in their le hand
and enters the authentication sequence using the index-nger of
their right hand. ese are both common grip seings for mobile
devices [16]. We focus exclusively on right handed entry modes to
reduce the complexity of our experiment. In charts and tables, we
describe these two hand positions as thumb for the single handed
grip with thumb entry, and index for the two handed grip with
index nger entry.
We applied these two conditions because we hypothesized (H7)
that visual obstructions may impact the vulnerability to shoulder
surng. For example, using an index nger provides the least ob-
structed view, compared to using the thumb, but it also may increase
point-of-view obfuscation where it may appear that contact is being
made with the phone, when it is only an illusion due to the the
angle of observation.
Angles of recording. We used a camera array to simultaneously
record each authentication (e.g., one phone type, one hand position
type, one authentication input) from multiple angles. e camera
array is shown in Figure 3. e target user, who is seated for the
study, is subject of observations from ve angles in the camera
array to simulate dierent vantage points. Outlined in Table 1, the
angles are, from each side le and right with a far and near angle.
We also had a top angle with a vantage immediate overhead of the
target user. In charts and tables, we shorthand these angles as: nl
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Figure 3: GoPro Camera Array: lower cameras are near,
higher cameras are far, and the middle camera is top
Angle Name Visual Description
Near Le (nl)
Over target’s le
shoulder at a height of
5’
Far Le ()
Over target’s le
shoulder at a height of
6’
Top (t) Over target’s head ata height of 6’
Near Right (nr)
Over target’s right
shoulder at a height of
5’
Far Right (fr)
Over target’s right
shoulder at a height of
6’
Table 1: Camera Angles
Figure 4: Full screen video with “focus zone” to highlight
where to view the authentication and to remove distractions
from other factors in the recording space.
for near le,  for far le, t for top, nr for near right, and fr for far
right.
We hypothesized that there may exist seings of observations
that both hinder and enhance the aackers ability to shoulder surf
(H4). For example, observations from one side over the other (e.g.,
le v. right) may provide more or less obstructed views, aiding or
hindering shoulder surng.
Editing Videos. During video recordings, we aempted to make
each authentication occur over a consistent length of time with
PINs properties Paerns properties
1328 up/non-adj 0145 up
1955 neutral/non-adj/repeats 1346 le
5962 right 3157 neutral
6702 down/kmove/cross 4572 right/cross
7272 le/kmoves/repeats 6745 down
153525 up/repeat 014763 le/cross
159428 neutral/cross/non-adj 136785 down
366792 right/repeat/kmove/cross 642580 neutral/cross
441791 le/kmove/repeat 743521 up/non-adj
458090 down/repeat 841257 right/kmove/cross
Table 2: PINs and patterns used in experiments. See Appen-
dix B.1 and B.2 for visuals of the authentication.
a consistent hand motion. We further aempted to remove any
distractions from the observation area so that participants can focus
directly on the task of shoulder surng. Each video recording, is
about 3-5 seconds in length, but this creates a tracking challenge
for the participant who needs to quickly determine where to look
in a video (occurring from dierent angles each time) to do the
observation. To alleviate this burden, we edited the videos by
placing a “focus zone” in the video. See Figure 4 for a visual of
this editing. Except for the authentication area, the remainder of
the screen is set with a transparent gray so that the participant
can quickly determine where to focus their visual aention for the
observation task.
3.2 Authentication Settings
As previously mentioned, we aim to analyze two dierent authenti-
cation seings, PINs and Android graphical paern unlock. Within
the Android paern seings, we also consider seings where the
tracing lines are either displayed or not displayed. Recent work has
suggested that tracing lines should not be displayed for improved
security [39]. For each authentication seing, we have chosen a
set of 10 representative PINs and paerns that have spatial shiing
properties and visual, complexity properties, such as crosses.
In the remainder of this section, we outline how that selection
was performed and justify the properties used during selection.
Additionally, we describe the application used for performing input
and how it was designed to fairly compare the two authentication
types.
Pattern Selections. e paerns used in our experiment are shown
in Table 2 (graphical representations are presented in the Appendix).
ese paerns were culled from a set of self-reported paerns col-
lected through an online study [4], and provided to us for analysis
and use. From these paerns, we identied ve 4-length paerns
and ve 6-length paerns that exhibited a broad set of representa-
tive features.
To determine which features to consider, we hypothesized that
there may be locations in the grid space that increase or decrease
the eectiveness of the aack (H5), as well as complexity features of
paerns [2, 3]. We were guided by related work [5, 41] in choosing
the features, for both spatial aspects and complexity properties.
• up shied: e contact points of the paern are in the
upper part of the grid space, such as paern 0145 and
743521.
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• down shied: e contact points of the paern are in the
lower part of the grid space, such as paern 6745 and
136785.
• le shied: e contact points of the paern are in the le
portion of the grid space, such as paern 1346 and 014673.
• right shied: e contact points of the paern are in the
right portion of the grid space, such as paern 4572 and
841257.
• neutral: e contact points are evenly distributed in the
grid space.
• non-adjacency (or non-adj): Two, non-adjacent contact
points are used, such as paern 743521, where contact
point 3 and 5 are non-adjacent and are connected because
contact point 4 was contacted prior.
• knight move (or kmove): Two contact points are connected
over two and down one (or in any symmetry), like a knight
moves in chess, like in paern 4572.
• cross: e sequence of contacts crosses over itself, such
as paern 014673 and 841257 have a perfect ‘X’, but more
obtuse crosses also exist, such as in paern 4572 due to a
knight move.
PIN selections. In order to select PINs, we followed related work
in analyzing digit sequences in password datasets [9]. Using the
RockYou dataset1, we extracted 4- and 6-length digit sequences that
exhibited similar properties to that of the paern dataset. e idea
being that these digit sequences are likely to be reused as PINs if
they appear in passwords.
Matching the PINs to the exact features in the paerns is not
perfect, as not all digit sequences found in paerns exist within
the RockYou dataset, and further, we wish to include all 10 digits
(paerns only use 9 contact points). PINs also have a feature that
paerns cannot have, repeated digits, so we wish to include PINs
with this property, either a single digit or multiple repeated digits.
e nal set of PINs selected are available in Table 2, and a visual
is provided in Appendix B.2.
Authentication Applications. Another important factor to con-
sider is the applications used for entering the authentication. Crit-
ically, the size of each application should be the same and have
similar visual properties, so as not to advantage one over the other
for shoulder surng. To this end, we designed two Javascript ap-
plications using HTML5 that ran in the Android Chrome browser,
setup as a home screen link to simulate a standalone application.
Each application mimicked the input used on the device, following
the same rules. During the survey, the same applications would be
used as embedded Javascript in their browser for the participants
to recreate the authentication observed.
For paerns with-line feedback, aer the target user completed
the application, there would be a brief, 200 ms pause before the
screen would go to blank/black screen. is is to simulate the
unlock process on the phone. A similar action occurs for paerns
without-line feedback, however, no tracing lines or circled contact
points would be seen.
1Originating from a debunk music sharing web site, the RockYou dataset was leaked
in 2009 and contains over 32 million passwords commonly used by researchers [42].
For PINs, the input text area would show the number that was
pressed, but would fade to an asterisk aer one second or aer the
next number was pressed, similar to how unlock authentication
works on smartphones. Only aer pressing “ok” would the screen
go blank, simulating an unlock.
3.3 Survey Protocol
We designed a protocol around the video recordings by which par-
ticipants would be assigned a randomized group, receiving training
relevant to that group, and then aempt to shoulder surf 10 au-
thentications based on observing videos under dierent seings.
e survey was designed as a web application using a combination
of PHP, Javascript, and a MySQL backend. e survey was posted
on Amazon Mechanical Turk and participants were also recruited
locally at our institution to ensure consistency.
e survey protocol proceeded as follows:
(1) Informed Consent
(2) Demographic and Background Information
(3) Training
(4) Observations and Recreation
(5) Aention Check and Submission
In the remainder of this section we outline each of these survey
segments in detail, as well as the randomization and recruitment
process.
Informed Consent and Preliminary Instructions. is survey
was approved by our institutional oversight board (IRB), and so
we require participants to provide informed consent. For online
participants, this was done digitally, and for in-person participants,
it was done in a traditional manner, following a script.
e informed consent also provided participants with an overview
of the experiment, its goals, and initial instructions. For example,
it informed participants that they were participating in a research
project about shoulder surng, as well as directions about the pro-
cedures:
e survey will request that you maximize the browser
window on your screen. You are not permied to record
the survey or any of its content. e use of pen and paper
to write anything down is also strictly prohibited. e
survey will request that you watch several videos of a user
authenticate into a mobile device. You are to watch the
video and aempt to recreate the PIN or paern you viewed
being entered.
Demographic andBackground Information. Following acknowl-
edgment of the informed consent, we ask a series of demographic
questions. Including:
• Gender (Male, Female, Prefer not to answer)
• Age (drop down box, 18-100)
• Eye Sight (Normal, Corrected with glasses/contacts, De-
cient and not corrected)
• Ability with modern cell phones (None, Below Average,
Average, Above Average, Professional)
Additionally, we recorded the screen size of the browser, in pixels,
to test if participants were following directions as well to get a
sense of the dierent viewing scenarios.
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Figure 5: Frame of tutorial video
Conditions Views Attempts
A One One
B One Two
C Two One
D Two (dierent angles) One
E Two (dierent angles) Two
Table 3: Five dierent conditions for each authentication
BetweenTreatmentRandomization andTraining. At this point
in the survey, we randomize the treatments as the remainder por-
tion is dependent on that randomization. We initially randomize
into 12 between subject treatment groups:
• Authentication Type: PIN, paerns with feedback lines, or
paerns without feedback lines
• Hand Position: index or thumb
• Phone Type: either the red Nexus 5 or the black OnePlus
One
Based on the selection, we prepared three training videos that ex-
plained the procedure further specically for each authentication
type, and then 12 sample test videos that participants can use to
practice shoulder surng. e test video used the same conditions
as the selected treatment, but with a sample PIN (1234) or Paern
(0123). e training video shows the participant how the obser-
vation and recall would proceed (a screen-shot of the video is in
Figure 5), and once the video completes, test runs are performed
using the sample PIN or paern. Participants are allowed to repeat
this training video and test runs as many times as needed before
continuing to the main portion of the survey.
Within Treatment Randomization for Observation and Re-
call. At this point, a participant has been assigned an authentica-
tion type, phone type, and hand position. ere is now a large set
of videos from multiple angles for each of the authentications, but
it is not feasible (nor desirable) to display every video to each par-
ticipant. Instead, we proceed with a within-group randomization
to display a subset of those videos under dierent seings that will
support testing hypothesis H2, H3, and H4.
e rst stage of randomization is to randomize the order of
the authentication that will be displayed. at is, each participant
will observe all 10 of the authentications in their selected authen-
tication type, either 10 PINs or 10 paerns, but the order of those
must be randomized to handle training eects where the partici-
pants become beer at the task as time goes on. Once the order
is randomized, for each authentication, we then randomize and
In-person Online (MTurk)
Male Female Total Male Female Non-Spec. Total
A
ge
18-24 68 23 91 103 78 181
25-34 304 221 6 531
35-44 142 120 1 263
45-54 47 87 134
54-64 21 27 48
65+ 7 8 1 16
Si
gh
t Decient 7 3 10
Corrected 12 9 21 225 252 3 480
Normal 56 14 70 392 286 5 684
Sk
ill
Below 17 11 9 37
Below Average 22 10 32 134 204 6 344
Above Average 38 12 50 344 277 1 622
Professional 8 1 9 129 49 1 179
Re
so
lu
tio
n < 1300 117 119 4 240
1300-1500 189 250 1 440
1500-1800 122 85 2 209
> 1800 68 23 196 87 1 284
68 23 91 624 541 8 1173
Table 4: Demographic Information. e resolution refers to
the width of the screen resolution, in pixels.
counterbalance a set of conditions regarding how many views and
aempts a participant gets to make, as outline in Table 3.
e “views” refer to how many times a participant gets to view an
observation video. For conditions A-C, a random angle is selected,
and the participant either gets a single view of that authentication
(A,B), or two views from the same angle (C). For conditions D and
E, participants get a random rst angle selection, and then are
assigned a second angle on the opposite side (e.g., rst angle is a
le side, second angle is a ride side). If the top angle was selected,
then a random second angle is used.
e second part of each condition is the number of aempts.
Aer viewing the video, the participant can make either one aempt
to recreate the authentication or two aempts.
Prior to each video observation, we informed the participant if
they were going to view one or two videos and if they would have
one or two aempts.
Submission and Attention Tests. Following the survey, we ask
participants to report if they used additional aids, such as pen and
paper, in helping them complete the procedure. is acts as both an
aention test and a guide for including or excluding results. It also
allows us to exclude participants who failed to follow directions.
We did not have anyone report that they “cheated.”
3.4 Recruitment
We recruited locally at our institution, and online via Amazon Me-
chanical Turk. e goal of using both recruitment methods is that
for the institutionally recruited participants, we can control the
seings, and so we wished to compare these results to those col-
lected online for consistency (see Figure 6). Inconsistent results
would suggest that online participants were not taking the survey
faithfully. We observed consistent results when comparing similar
demographic groups with similar screen resolutions, as described
later, suggesting that participants online took the survey in the
intended ways. Although, there was some degradation of perfor-
mance, which may be accounted for by an observation bias or the
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Online (MTurk) In-person
Single View Multi View Single View Multi View
4-length 6-length 4-length 6-length total 4-length 6-length 4-length 6-length total
PIN 34.92% 10.86% 56.72% 26.53% 32.25% 52.63% 20.75% 76.62% 59.32% 46.02%
NPAT 51.03% 35.28% 71.27% 52.10% 52.28% 72.29% 62.31% 84.31% 95.38% 72.92%
PAT 80.90% 64.20% 88.07% 79.85% 78.27% 94.5% 86.74% 98.61% 83.53% 92.42%
total 55.73% 37.28% 72.15% 52.81% 73.70% 56.70% 86.5% 80.38%
46.45% 62.53% 54.54% 65.11% 83.37% 70.81%
Table 5: Single- vs. multi-view for authentication types broken up based on online and in-person participants. NPAT is pattern
without feedback lines and PAT is with feedback lines. Comparing single vs. multi-view, in all categories, was statistically
signicant, as well as in-person vs online.
Hawthorne eect; local participants, being observed, were more
likely to try and perform the task well to appease their observers.
In total, we recruited 91 participants locally at our institution, and
1173 online participants. e demographic information is available
in Table 4. e material used in recruitment mimicked that of the
informed consent. e text used in posting the task to Amazon
Mechanical Turk is provided in Appendix A.
3.5 Realism and Limitations
We acknowledge that our experimental methodology has a number
of limitations. Foremost, we had to reduce the set of authentication
tokens to a reasonable size, namely 10, so that we could maintain a
reasonable survey length with a reasonable recruitment size. We
aempted to mitigate this eect by choosing real authentications,
as collected in other datasets, that would be representative of au-
thentication choice broadly. We further did not include text-based
passwords, which can form an unlock authentication, as we were
unable to develop a protocol to fairly compare to the other authen-
ticators.
We were additionally limited in terms of the observation seings.
Our online participants may have used screens that were bigger or
smaller than we anticipated. We aempt to manage this limitation
by recording the screen size, and, as we will show in this paper,
there was an impact on performance with respect to screen size.
However, general trend lines remain the same, when we compare
the online data to that collected in-person.
3.6 Ethical Considerations
is protocol was reviewed and approved by our institution review
board to ensure that participants were treated fairly, such as pro-
viding informed consent and an option to opt-out. e survey itself
does not elicit ethical challenges as participants are not performing
actions that increase the risk to others or themselves in regard
to shoulder surng. It could be argued these participants may be
more aware of the risks associated with these aacks aer having
participated. e identity of the target victim was protected from
participants via obfuscation. Finally, the analysis does not include
identiable information about participants.
4 RESULTS
In this section, we describe the results of the survey by address-
ing each of the hypotheses outlined earlier. We also provide other
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Figure 6: Screen width resolution comparison. In-person
subjects used a screen with resolution 990x1840 and are in
the age range of 18-24. ere is no signicant dierence (G-
Test) between PIN and PAT, there remains a signicant dif-
ference for NPAT when comparing in-person samples to on
line ones with similar resolutions and demographics.
insights as available, particularly related to the realism of the exper-
iment. As we move through the results, it is important to note that
in some conditions (C and E) participants had multiple aempts to
recreate the observed authentication, which we study in more detail
later. Unless otherwise noted, we consider a successful aack if
the participants accurately recalled and entered the authentication
sequence within either of the aempts.
For statistical testing, our data is categorical and binary, as in a
participant either correctly recalled and entered an authentication
sequence or did not. As such, in two way comparisons of aack
rates, we applied Fisher’s Exact Test (or G-test) to test signicance,
and χ2 test for comparing for multi-factor analysis. Additionally,
we perform a L1-penalty logistic regression analysis to determine
the impact (or lack thereof) of all seings of the experiment. A
signicance level of p < 0.05 is used. Finally, unless otherwise
stated, each of the tables, when a percentage is displayed, this refers
to the rate in which an authentication was successfully recreated
in that seing, a so called success or aack rate.
Realism of online results. An important question to consider is
if online results are consistent with those collected in-person. As
evident in Table 5, there is a signicant performance improvement
for those in-person participants (p < 0.005, using χ2). Investigating
this phenomenon further, we broke down the participants based
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Hand Position Phone Type Input Aempts
Index umb G-test Red Black G-test One Two G-test
PIN 32.74% 32.22% p = 0.68 30.84% 34.04% p < 0.05 35.51% 30.43% p < 0.00005
NPAT 53.82% 50.75% p < 0.05 76.22% 80.23% p < 0.05 56.56% 49.38% p < 1 × 10−7
PAT 79.93% 76.69% p < 0.05 53.40% 50.97% p < 0.0005 79.90% 77.16% p < 1 × 10−9
total 55.30% 53.78% p < 0.05 52.92% 56.06% p < 0.0005 57.46% 52.56% p < 0.005
Table 6: Hand position, phone type, input attempts, and observation angle impact for online participants. For hand position
and phone type, single and multi-view treatments are considered.
Observation Angle
far-right far-le near-right near-le top
PIN 20.39%** 18.88%** 21.77%** 32.46%** 22.09%**
NPAT 46.09% 35.62%** 46.57% 41.89%** 45.14%*
PAT 70.31%** 68.23%** 73.47%** 71.50%** 79.08%**
total 45.77%** 41.03%** 47.43%* 49.15% 49.18%
Table 7: Impact of observation angle on shoulder surng.
Single-view treatments and only multi-view treatments of
the same angle are considered (see Table 5 for single- vs.
multi-view). Using χ2 testing, ∗ indicates p < 0.05, ∗∗ indi-
cates p < 0.005.
on the width of the screen resolution used while taking the survey,
which is a good approximation for the size of their viewing area.
ese results are presented in Figure 6, and one can clearly see that
as the resolution width increases, so does the performance. As we
controlled our in-person computing setup, we know precisely the
screen resolution of 990x1840, and further, our in-person partici-
pants (being undergraduates) are between the ages of 18-24. When
isolating this demographic group, we nd no statistical dierences
between the PIN and PAT results, with remaining dierence for
paerns without traceback lines (NPAT). is dierence is likely
the result of an observation bias, by which having the researchers
present led the participants to want to perform the task “beer.”
As such, we nd that these results suggest that online participants
likely took the survey in the intended manner, and variations in
screen size (and other factors) probably realistically mimic the real-
ities of shoulder surng in the wild. e remaining results focus
solely on the online dataset.
H1: authentication type. We applied both Fisher’s exact test and
χ2 test to the data in Table 5 and found all comparisons between
authentication type to be signicant. Focusing on the online re-
sults, we nd that the authentication plays a signicant role. PINs
proved the most elusive in all seings, with combined performance
of 32.25% aack rate. Paerns with traceback lines was the worst
performing, 78.27% aack rate across all seings. Removing trace-
back lines improved results to 58.28%, conrming prior work on
this topic [39]. As such, we accept the hypothesis that the au-
thentication type impacts shoulder surng vulnerability.
H2: repeated observations. Using the results in Table 5, we nd
that there are signicant dierences between the single-view and
multi-view seings. Looking at both online and in-person results,
participants are about 1.3x-1.4x more likely to correctly aack an au-
thentication if allowed multiple views of the authentication. Later,
as we compare all the features, we nd that multiple views, in partic-
ular, play an outsized role in the vulnerability of authentication to
shoulder surng. As such, we accept the hypothesis that mul-
tiple observations impact shoulder surng vulnerability.
H3: multiple input attempts. Recall that we applied a within-
group randomization by which some participants on some authen-
tication were provided two aempts to input the authentication.
e procedure of the survey informed them of this fact, so partici-
pants were aware, prior to viewing the video, that they would have
multiple recreation aempts. Table 6 shows these results on the
right column.
Surprisingly, multiple aempts decrease performance, in all
cases. We believe this is because participants, knowing they would
have multiple aempts, aempted to “game” the process in a way
that actually led them to get the paern wrong in both aempt
cases. For example, they would pay aention less well. We accept
the hypothesis that multiple input attempts aect shoulder
surng, but it decreases performance, unexpectedly. From this
result, researchers should consider for similar experiments to either
not informing participants how many aempts at recreation, or
force participants into a regime of single aempts, requiring more
aention during that single aempt.
H4: observation angle. Table 7 presents the results comparing
performance for the dierent observation angles. As we wished to
isolate the angle, we only consider treatments where a single obser-
vation angle was used. We used a χ2-test to determine signicance
factors in these scenarios, indicated with *’s in the table. In nearly
all cases, within each authentication type, we found that there are
signicant impacts based on the angle of observation. When per-
forming comparisons in total, we nd that the far-right, far-le and
near-right angles showed the most signicant impact. e far-le
angle, in particular, was the most challenging angle, and we believe
that this angle provide some obfuscation of when screen touching
occurred, making it harder for participant to cleanly determine
the location of touch events. As such, we accept the hypothesis
that the observation angle aects shoulder surng.
H5: properties of authentication. We rst consider the length
of the authentication, the results of which are displayed in Ta-
ble 5. e length has a large impact. In most cases, it decreased
the rate of shoulder surng by nearly 50%. While length is far
from a perfect approximation for security, it’s clear that longer
authentication will improve security from observation aack. We
further breakdown the vulnerability of the individual authentica-
tions in Table 8. Many of the authentications vary from an expected
uniform aack rate, as observed by using a χ2 test within each au-
thentication length. However, there does not appear to be a direct
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PIN NPAT PAT
1328 50.36% 0145 81.10%** 0145 92.28%**
1955 47.89% 1346 43.18%* 1346 82.96%**
5962 36.10%** 3157 60.26%** 3157 87.09%**
6702 34.64%** 4572 47.90% 4572 74.12%**
7272 60.53%** 6745 73.70%** 6745 86.51%**
153525 15.40%** 014763 53.44% 014763 84.01%**
159428 17.17%** 136785 41.81%* 136785 73.76%**
366792 19.57%** 642580 46.49% 642580 74.03%**
441791 20.66%** 743521 37.90%** 743521 53.79%
458090 21.83%** 841257 37.78%** 841257 73.93%**
Table 8: Individual authentication attack rate. Signicance
tested using χ2 within authentication of the same length, *
indicating p < 0.05 and ** indication p < 0.005, or much less
than.
paern related to the individual spatial properties of the authenti-
cation, additional analysis with more authentication types would
be needed to draw strong conclusions regarding these features.
As such, we partially accept the hypothesis that the proper-
ties of authentication impact shoulder surng, while features
such as authentication length play a large role, the impact of other
features is inconclusive.
H6: phone size. Table 6 shows the result of comparing the two
phones in the study. Recall that the Red phone refers to the 5”
display Nexus 5, and the Black phone refers to the 5.5” display
of OnePlus One. Across all conditions, we nd that there is a
signicant dierence in shoulder surng between the two phones.
In most cases, the larger Black phone provides less security, except
for paerns (PAT), where the smaller Red phone is more secure.
Aer reviewing the videos, we noticed that the larger Black phone
experiences more glare during this recording which could account
for the dierence. Overall, it appears that the larger phones provide
less security for shoulder surng, and we accept the hypothesis.
H7: hand position. Recall that we examined two dierent hand
positions. One hand position (or grip) had the victim use a single
hand, entering the authentication with his thumb. e second hand
position was two handed, holding the phone in the le hand en-
tering the paerns with the right index nger. Table 6 shows the
results of comparing these two conditions, thumb vs index. e
results for comparing PINs showed no signicant dierence; how-
ever there was signicant, but small, dierences between paern
entry for the dierent hand positions, as well as a small signicant
dierence overall. While there is a dierence, the impact factor
is challenged, so we reject the hypothesis that hand position
impacts shoulder surng. ese results suggest that researchers
can allow for any normal hand position without greatly impacting
the results; however, using an index nger provides a more direct
view, as opposed to the one-handed thumb blocking portions of the
screen) and likely improves results, nominally.
Comparison across features. Finally, we wish to understand
how the combination of the features impact the results, asking
the question, are there a set of ideal conditions or non-ideal con-
ditions for shoulder surng that can form a set of baselines? To
accomplish this, we performed a logistic regression across all the
features using L1-penalties such that features that have small (or
Feature Coecient
PIN -0.90**
PAT 1.25**
NPAT 0.00
4-length 0.42*
6-length -0.33*
umb -0.03
Index 0.06
Red -0.03
Black 0.09
Feature Coecient
Single-View -0.09
Multi-View 0.40*
One-Input 0.11*
Two-Input -0.10*
far-le -0.24*
far-right -0.06
near-le 0.12*
near-right 0.00
top 0.14*
Table 9: L1-penalty logistic regression using all features, the
average of 100 runs of the regression. 68.7% of the data is
explained by the regression. e * indicate top ranked coef-
cients. e model is signicant.
no) eect can have a coecient of zero. e results of an average of
100 runs of the regression (there were many dierent minimums)
are presented in Table 9.
e regression was set-up using a feature set of binary values,
with a one indicating the presence of the feature and zero other-
wise. e label on the feature was also binary, a zero indicating
that shoulder surng aack failed and one indicating success. We
trained over each trial of the survey, and the resulting model was
able to explain 68.7% of the data and was signicant.
We can further analyze the coecients of the features which
indicate how much weight they provide to the prediction and also if
they increase or decrease the likelihood of shoulder surng. Nega-
tive values imply greater security to shoulder surng, while positive
values indicate more vulnerability to shoulder surng. As we are
using L1 penalty, some coecients can reduce to zero.
Most surprisingly, the coecient for NPAT (paerns without
tracing lines) is 0. is makes sense if you consider the fact that
being a PIN so greatly reducing the likelihood of shoulder surng,
while paerns greatly increase the likelihood. e fact that it is
a paern without lines is not predictive, in comparison to those
other two facts. Further, the highest coecient is that of shoulder
surng a paern, followed by PINs (in the negative direction). is
further supports accepting hypothesis H1.
Among the other coecients, the length factor and having multi-
ple views of the authentication play a large role in shoulder surng
aack rates. e far-le angle proved to be the most challenging
for shoulder surng, as identied earlier while near-le and top
were the most benecial for shoulder surng.
Based on these results, we can now identify category of the best
case scenario for an aacker performing shoulder surng: aacking
a paern with tracing lines that is of length four when provided
multiple with views. Similarly, the worst case scenario is aacking
a PIN of length 6 from the far le when provided with just one
view. ese two scenarios can provide a baseline to compare new
systems that oer protections to shoulder surng, as well as help
inform users of stronger authentication choices.
5 CONCLUSION
We presented the results of a large scale, online study of shoulder
surng for the most common unlock authentication, PINs, paerns
with tracing lines, and paerns without tracing lines. We nd that
PINs are the most secure to shoulder surng aacks, and while
both types of paern input are poor, paerns without lines provides
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greater security. e length of the input also has an impact; longer
authentication is more secure to shoulder surng. Additionally, if
the aacker has multiple-views of the authentication, the aacker’s
performance is greatly improved.
Overall, the goal of this research is to work towards establishing
baselines for how current authentication performs against shoulder
surng, as well as provide insight into seings of current authenti-
cation that can protect users from shoulder surng. Based on our
analysis, researchers should consider comparing their performance
of new systems to the most secure seing, namely using at least
6-digit PINs with just a single view, as well as to the least secure
seing of using a 4-length paern with visible lines with multiple
views. Additionally, these results suggest, for users, that 6-digit (or
longer) PINs provide the best security from shoulder surng.
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A SURVEY ADVERTISEMENT
We are conducting an academic survey about shoulder surng on mobile
device authentication mechanisms. We would like you to act as an aacker
aempting to get someone’s mobile device password by observing videos
of a user authenticating into a mobile device. If you are currently viewing
this page on a mobile device (ie. cell phone or tablet), please switch to a
desktop or laptop computer to take this survey. If you get to the survey and
it detects a mobile device, you will be opted out of the survey. Please select
the link below to complete the survey. At the end of the survey, you will
receive a code to enter into the submission form below to receive credit for
taking our survey.
THE SURVEY WILL ONLY WORK IF YOU VIEW IT ON A NON-MOBILE
DEVICE COMPUTER.
We have only tested the survey using GOOGLE CHROME OR MOZILLA
FIREFOX. If you experience problems, opt out and return the HIT without
penalty.
You will be compensated $1.50 for your work. We have found that it
takes approximately 10 minutes on average to complete this HIT, for a
payout of about $0.15 a minute
Due to the nature of the work, you may only complete the HIT once,
even across multiple posting of the HIT. If you accept the HIT and are
notied that your work will not be accepted, please return the HIT. FAIL-
URE TO FOLLOW THIS INSTRUCTION MAY RESULT IN WORK BEING
EXCLUDED AND/OR A REJECTION.
Please feel free to contact the requester if you have any questions or
concerns. A prompt reply should occur within 24 hours or sooner.
Note: this survey requires your browser to load several high quality
videos. We do not recommend you aempt this survey if you have a limited
data connection.
B PATTERNS AND PINS VISUALIZED
B.1 Patterns
Paerns used with properties: a double circle indicates a start point,
while a single circle indicates a point included in the paern. Note
that labeling of paerns begins in the upper le with 0, ending in
the lower right with 8 (See Figure 1)
0145 6745
up down
3157 1346
neutral le
4572 743521
right/cross up/non-adj
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136785 642580
down neutral/cross
014673 841257
le right/kmove/cross
B.2 PINs
PINs used with properties: lled circle is the start point, multiple
circles on a number indicate multiple touches.
1328 6702
up/non-adj down/kmove/cross
1955 7272
neutral/non-adj/repeats le/kmoves/repeats
5962 152525
right up/repat
458090 159428
down/repeat neutral/cross/non-adj
441791 366792
le/kmove/repeat right/repeat/kmove/cross
